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Structural realism holds that ontological commitments induced by suc-
cessful scientifi c theories should focus on the structures rather than the 
objects posited by the theories. Thus structural realism goes beyond the 
empirical adequacy criterion of traditional (or constructive) empiricism. 
It also attempts to avoid the problems scientifi c realism faces in contexts 
of radical theory change accompanied by discordant shifts in posited 
theoretical objects. Structural realism emerged in the context of attempts 
to interpret developments in twentieth-century physics. In a biological 
context, Stanford (2006) provided pre-emptive criticism. French (2011, 
2012) has since attempted to answer those criticisms and extend struc-
tural realism to the biological realm. This paper argues that, though 
Stanford’s criticism may be misplaced, and structural realism fares 
much better than traditional scientifi c realism in biological contexts, it 
remains a promissory note. The promise is based on shifting the focus of 
the debate from the status of biological laws to that of biological organi-
zation, an issue that remains a live debate within biology.
Keywords: Biology, emergentism, empiricism, holism, instrumen-
talism, reductionism, scientifi c realism; structural realism.
1. Introduction
Structural realism is conveniently decomposed into four related claims 
which form a sustained argument. Let the entities posited by a scien-
tifi c theory or model1 consist of two types: objects and structures, for 
* For comments and criticisms on an earlier draft thanks are due to Steven 
French. This paper was begun during time spent at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu 
Berlin (Summer 2012). Thanks are due to the Kolleg for support.
1 Throughout this paper, theories and models will be assumed to be entities of the 
same logical type, differing only in the generality of their intended domains. There is 
a body of philosophical literature that distinguishes between the so-called syntactic 
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instance, diachronic or synchronic relationships of varying complexity 
that hold between the posited objects. Typically, the dynamical pos-
sibilities allowed by the theory or model (what may happen over time) 
will be incorporated into these structures (in terms of rules governing 
them). The four components of structural realism are:
       1. The history of science, especially in cases of radical theory 
change, shows that the (theoretical) objects2 postulated even by 
empirically well-confi rmed theories often disappear and are re-
placed by radically different ones—consider examples such as 
vortices, the caloric, phlogiston, ether, and protoplasm.
       2. This aspect of scientifi c change critically undermines any onto-
logical commitment to objects postulated by theories whether 
this commitment is only about what can be known (an epistemic 
claim) or about what there is (an ontic claim).
       3. In contrast, some of the structures posited by theories, for in-
stance, the laws governing the putative objects, are often resil-
ient across radical theoretical change. The second law of thermo-
dynamics, for instance, survived the transition from the caloric 
theory to classical thermodynamics and even to the kinetic theo-
ry of matter; so did many of the known chemical laws during the 
transition from phlogiston to oxygen.
       4. Thus, in contrast to the situation with theoretically posited ob-
jects, there is ample ground for ontological commitment to the 
theoretically posited structures of well-confi rmed theories even 
in the face of radical theory change.
Part (4) encapsulates the central claim of structural realism which is 
presumed to be a consequence of the fi rst three parts.
The epistemic version of structural realism holds that the relevant 
structures comprise all that can be known; the ontic version, which is 
the principal locus of contemporary structural realist research, claims 
that these structures are all that there is (independent of any particu-
lar theories about them). Either version avoids the pitfalls of the object-
oriented scientifi c realism that came into vogue in the 1960s and 1970s 
in the early post-logical empiricist philosophy of science following a 
general (and, perhaps, misguided) rejection of the instrumentalism as-
sociated with most of the logical empiricist canon. Structural realism 
also goes beyond traditional empiricism in denying incorrigible phe-
nomenal content as the epistemic foundation for scientifi c knowledge 
and, especially, by not accepting a criterion empirical adequacy as the 
and semantic interpretations of theories, with “models” supposed to be related to 
the latter; however, neither the goals of that project, nor the many problems with 
such accounts, are relevant to the issues treated in this paper. Most importantly, the 
usage here follows standard scientifi c usage in biology (and elsewhere)—see Frigg 
and Hartmann (2006).
2 The term “object” must be construed broadly to include any non-relational 
entity (particle, fi eld, cell, information, community, carrying capacity, etc.). 
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sole desideratum for the adjudication of theoretical commitment, the 
latter position being closely associated with constructive empiricism 
(van Fraassen 1980).
Historically, structural realism was developed with the goal of pro-
viding a viable realist interpretation of modern (twentieth-century) 
physics taking into account the profound conceptual changes induced 
by quantum mechanics as well as the special and general theories of 
relativity. Stanford (2006) pre-emptively criticized its applicability to 
biology as part of a general critique of realism about science. French 
(2011, 2012) attempted to answer those criticisms and extend struc-
tural realism to the biological domain. This attempt is usefully ana-
lyzed into two separate theses: (i) a critique of object-oriented realism 
about biology; and (ii) a tentative defense of realism about structures 
interpreted as biological laws3 which, though admittedly lacking uni-
versality, apparently remain resilient under many theoretical changes.
The purpose of the present paper is to offer a critical assessment of 
structural realism in biology. Because structural and any other forms 
of realism are easy to criticize on purely philosophical grounds, espe-
cially when divorced from the practice of science, and when no alterna-
tive need be provided, Section 2 will sketch a set of positive theses that 
are supposed to criticize structural realism and fare somewhat better 
at interpreting contemporary biology. As a consequence of that discus-
sion, Section 3 will largely endorse French’s skepticism about object-
oriented realism in biology but emphasize several subtleties that dilute 
the impact of his critique. However, and more importantly, it will also 
extend this skepticism to the biological laws favored by French in his 
defense of structural realism in biology. Section 4 will turn to the role 
of organization—and that sense of structure—in the history of biology, 
and in contemporary biology, and argue that this is where structural 
realism is most plausible in biology. Section 5 will question whether, 
even in its most plausible domain, prospects for structural realism in 
biology are better than dim. It will be inconclusive. Ostensibly to com-
pensate for that, Section 6 will draw some conclusions.
2. Positive Agenda
It will be instructive to begin with the putatively central insight of 
structural realism: that certain structures (for instance, relationships 
between putative objects) persists over radical theory change, radical 
in the sense that the objects postulated by the earlier theory do not sur-
vive the same transformation. This point will be illustrated in this sec-
tion using an example that instrumentalist critics of structural realism 
have deployed in favor of their own position, viz., Galton’s biometrical 
3 It is open to question whether structures should necessarily be interpreted as 
laws or even as relationships between (adequately individualized) objects. I follow 
French on this point for biological contexts. Nothing in French’s discussion—or 
mine—restricts structures to laws or relations.
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Law of Ancestral Heredity.4 The discussion here will bring that use of 
this law into question.
However, before turning to the details of that example, it is worth 
emphasizing (with French [2011, 201]), the general non-persistence of 
theoretical objects in biology. Take perhaps the single most important 
such object of twentieth-century biology: the gene. Two points, both 
of which deserve much further elaboration than will be possible here, 
are of relevance: (i) It is far from clear that “gene” continues to play 
any theoretical role, rather than an informal heuristic one, in con-
temporary postgenomic accounts of heredity.5 Arguably, in explicit 
theoretical discussions of DNA behavior during cell reproduction and 
differentiation, the concept of a gene has no more a cognitive role in 
contemporary biology that what the concept of an electron orbiting a 
nucleus has in contemporary chemistry. If this is correct, even though 
much of the insights of classical genetics, in the forms of rules of trans-
mission and expression of traits, continue to remain relevant, during 
the last two decades the gene has lost its the pre-eminent ontological 
status that it had in biology for almost a century (Keller 2002b). (ii) To 
the extent that certain DNA sequences can still be usefully character-
ized as traditional genes (most importantly, some of that tiny fraction 
of DNA in most eukaryotes that uniquely specify amino acid sequences 
of proteins6), these objects share as few properties with Johannsen’s 
(1905) original “genes” as today’s atoms do with Dalton’s creation. For 
instance, thanks to ubiquitous alternative splicing, a single gene may 
often specify more than one phenotype (at least at the protein level). 
Stein (1989) has aptly pointed out that to assume the “reality” of the 
atom and not, say, of the ether on the basis of the persistence of one 
term and not of the other is no more than a surrender to the vagaries of 
changes in linguistic usage. The same point can be made about the per-
sistence of “gene”; an even stronger case can be made against another 
pillar of mid-twentieth century molecular biology: biological “informa-
tion” (Sarkar 1996).
In contrast, turn now to a discarded tradition in the study of hered-
ity that once held considerable promise: Galton, Weldon, and Pearson’s 
science of biometry.7 Galton posited the existence of a “stirp” in the 
4 This example is important in this context because it forms part of Stanford’s 
(2006) critique of structural realism which will be discussed later in the text. For a 
more detailed philosophical analysis, see Sarkar (1998, Chapter 5). 
5 See Perini (2011) for a good discussion and an entry into the extensive literature.
6 The qualifi cation “some of” is necessary to exclude overlapping genes, etc.—see 
Sarkar (1996) on this point; the qualifi cation “uniquely” similarly avoids problems 
associated with alternative splicing. The qualifi cation “traditional” is necessary 
because it is not at all unusual to refer to any functional DNA segment as a gene 
(e.g., Lynch [2007], Koonin [2011], etc.), no matter whether it is transcribed and 
translated, transcribed but not translated, or even plays a regulatory role in some 
other way—this is the heuristic or informal notion of a gene noted earlier.
7 The best summary is Pearson (1900); Provine (1972) and Sarkar (1998) provide 
historical and philosophical discussion.
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germinal cells of organisms which mediated the inheritance of traits 
from parent to offspring. On the basis of this model of inheritance, he 
postulated several nomological claims, the most famous of which was 
the quantitative Law of Ancestral Heredity which, after subsequent 
clarifi cation and reformulation by Pearson, states (roughly) that the 
ancestral contribution to any hereditary trait of an individual organ-
ism decreases in a geometric series with distance up the family tree.8 
The biometricians were (correctly) adamant that a wealth of quantita-
tive empirical data on continuously varying traits from the 1880s and 
1890s supported the Law of Ancestral Heredity.
It is uncontroversial that the theoretical claims of biometry—in 
particular, Galton’s stirp model of inheritance (to the extent it should 
even be taken to be part of the science of biometry)—were superseded 
and replaced by Mendel’s model of inheritance shortly after Mendel’s 
work was recovered around 1900, and after an acrimonious dispute 
between adherents of the two sides with the Mendelians represented 
primarily by Bateson but with support from others including Punnett.9 
Yet, as Olby (1966, 1987) and others have periodically pointed out, the 
mathematical relationship incorporated in the Law of Ancestral Hered-
ity, interpreted as a correlation between traits of an organism and its 
ancestors (rather than as a “contribution” from ancestors), continues to 
hold in a Mendelian10 context.
This would seem to be grist for the structural realist’s mill. Stanford 
(2006: 182), however, is dismissive; according to him, what Olby’s ob-
servation (and others that are similar) show is that:
“the formal relationship described by the Ancestral Law [sic] can certainly 
be unearthed by suffi ciently persistent digging into the corners of the theo-
retical description of the world given to us by contemporary genetics.
But it is equally true that contemporary genetics does not recognize the 
fractional relationships expressed in Galton’s Ancestral Law as describing 
any fundamental or even particularly signifi cant aspect of the mathemati-
cal structure of inheritance.”
Stanford continues with a dismissal of Worrall’s (1989) version of struc-
tural realism.
Though the neutrality between realism and instrumentalism that 
I generally endorse shares some of Stanford’s skepticism about real-
ism, his dismissal of the Law of Ancestral Heredity is unwarranted. 
Any serious history of the Law of Ancestral Heredity must pay more 
attention to the pertinent detail. Pearson’s reformulation of the Law of 
8 Galton’s (1965) fi rst rudimentary statement occurs in the work taken to be 
the origin of eugenics, “Hereditary Talent and Character”; Pearson’s fi nal statement 
appears in the second edition of The Grammar of Science (Pearson 1900).
9 This has been extensively documented by Provine (1971).
10 The term “Mendelian” instead of “Mendel’s” is being used to distinguish 
between what became part of the new (Mendelian) genetics between 1900 and 1920 
and Mendel’s own statements which required considerable modifi cation during the 
formulation and establishment of what came to be called Mendelian genetics.
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Ancestral Heredity involved two related crucial philosophical moves: 
(i) He dropped the stirp model altogether and eschewed causal talk (of 
“contribution”) in favor of correlation between traits. So, whether or 
not Galton’s stirp model of inheritance (which constitutes an object-ori-
ented ontology) is correct becomes irrelevant to the status of the Law. 
(ii) In general, Pearson insisted that, in the historical context in which 
biometry was attempting to construct a quantitative theory of evolu-
tion by natural selection, the laws of heredity should remain what will 
be called phenomenological. This move to phenomenological character-
ization was a consequence of Pearson’s quite sophisticated positivism—
but that is a story for some other occasion.
By “phenomenological” here I mean laws that employ the same 
(or very similar) conceptual resources as those deployed to report the 
results of experiments. This is a matter of degree. Some claims are 
more phenomenological than others; in that sense they are less theo-
retical than those others. Note that there is no claim here of any hard 
observational-theoretical distinction. How experimental reports are 
formulated depends on what theories are taken to be suffi ciently well-
established so as not to be challenged by the experiments being per-
formed. What is at stake here is that, in the given context of research, 
phenomenological resources can be used to formulate claims that can 
be used to adjudicate between the theories that are in play. Returning 
to the example at hand, the Law of Ancestral Heredity, interpreted 
phenomenologically, could potentially be used to distinguish between 
Galton’s and Mendel’s models of inheritance. Historically, it turned out 
to be the case that it is consistent with both in the sense that both 
models semi-formally predict it, where mathematical predictions are 
deemed to be “semi-formal” if they require idealizations or incorrigible 
approximations.11
What is more important in this context is that the Law of Ances-
tral Heredity was taken to be suffi ciently empirically well-supported 
to impose constraints (adequacy conditions) on permissible theorizing 
about heredity in the 1900–1920 period: any adequate theory of heredi-
ty had to incorporate that Law. This is seen, in particular, by Pearson’s 
(1904a, b) own attempts to derive the law from Mendel’s rules as well 
as Doncaster’s (1910) review of recent work in heredity which discussed 
both Mendel’s rules and the Law.12 When Fisher (1918) began his ambi-
tious project of using Mendel’s rules to account for inheritance patterns 
of continuously varying traits—what led to the subsequent discipline 
of quantitative genetics—it was still perceived to be critical to estab-
lish consistency between the Law of Ancestral Heredity and Mendelian 
11 Here “incorrigible” means that there is no known procedure to weaken the 
relevant approximation—for a discussion, see Sarkar (1998: 49).
12 Even by 1920 Doncaster had not changed his mind—see Lock and Doncaster 
(1920).
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rules13, hardly something to be dismissed as “persistent digging into 
the corners of the theoretical description of the world given to us by 
contemporary genetics.” What Fisher showed was remarkable: the Law 
of Ancestral Heredity could be semi-derived from Mendelian rules.14 
An entire section of “The Correlation between Relatives on the Sup-
position of Mendelian Inheritance” (§ 17) was devoted to deriving that 
Law from Mendelian assumptions. It amounted to a reduction of the 
Law of Ancestral Heredity to Mendelian genetics. In fact, what Fisher 
achieved was the reduction of all the more salient nomological claims 
of biometry to a Mendelian basis. This included, for example, the rule 
that quantitative traits follow the normal distribution in large popu-
lations.15 After Fisher’s derivation the empirical status of the Law of 
Ancestral Heredity was no longer in question: evidence for Mendelian 
genetics was ipso facto evidence for that Law (at least informally).16 
What changed was that all the biometrical generalizations proved to be 
of decreasing utility in practical contexts of quantitative genetics, the 
most important ones being those of agriculture and animal breeding.
Structural realists will interpret this situation as indicating that 
though there should be no ontological commitment to theoretical ob-
jects (Galton’s stirp of Mendelian genes), there are grounds for such 
commitment to the relevant structures, that is, associated laws such as 
the Law of Ancestral Heredity. This position can be bolstered using a 
wealth of examples from the physical sciences including, as noted ear-
lier, the persistence of the second law of thermodynamics in the transi-
tion from the caloric theory to classical thermodynamics (incorporating 
the fi rst law, or conservation of energy). Contrary to Stanford (2006), 
such an interpretation of the signifi cance of the persistence of the Law 
of Ancestral Heredity is hardly far-fetched.
What skeptics of structural realism must do is to provide a more 
scientifi cally compelling interpretation of these developments (in the 
sense of a more plausible interpretation of history and practice in the 
relevant scientifi c episode). What follows is a sketch such a position, 
one which is supposed to provide a contrast to structural realism but 
does not endorse any form of anti-realism (including constructive em-
piricism). Rather, partly following and extending the discussions of 
Nagel (1961) and Stein (1989), it sees no essential difference between 
13 Fisher was neither the fi rst nor the only geneticist to acknowledge this 
requirement: Yule (1902) and Weinberg (1909a, b; 1910) were among those 
who preceded him—Stern (1965) provides an illuminating discussion of these 
developments.
14 For critical discussion, see the commentary by Moran and Smith (1966) and 
the discussion in Sarkar (1998, 106 –107).
15 This aspect of the creation of quantitative genetics is discussed in more detail 
by Sarkar (1998, Chapter 5). See, also, Frogatt and Nevin (1971). But much more 
philosophical analysis would be welcome—and would not go unnoticed.
16 In general, evidence for a reducing theory is indirect evidence for the one that 
is reduced (Sarkar 1998).
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a sophisticated instrumentalism and a modest version of structural re-
alism which is closer to the epistemic rather than ontic version. Ulti-
mately, the force of the critique of structural realism being developed 
here should be taken to rest partly on the plausibility of this alterna-
tive view.
It will serve to present this alternative position as being constituted 
by four distinct substantive points followed by one polemical one which 
is of less importance:
       1. With structural realism, it agrees that the history of science 
makes it impossible to defend any ontological commitment to 
theoretical objects (object-oriented realism).
       2. Again with structural realism, it agrees that the certain struc-
tures are more resilient across theoretical change than objects. 
In the biological context these structures include (but are not 
limited to) laws though not all laws have the required degree of 
resilience.
       3. Unlike structural realism, the resilience of these laws is ex-
plained by their phenomenological status in the context in which 
they are introduced or used to adjudicate between rival theories. 
This is a central tenet of the position being advocated here and 
some elaboration seems in order. In a given historical context, 
phenomenological laws are supposed to be theoretically neutral 
in the sense that the theories being adjudicated do not differ in 
their predictions (or otherwise) with respect these laws. By and 
large—and this a claim subject to historical test—in further de-
velopment of a fi eld, laws that were deemed phenomenological 
in one context will remain so in future contexts because it seems 
implausible that they will become “theory laden” with newer, typ-
ically more abstract, theoretical assumptions.17 Thus, phenom-
enological laws form part of what each successive theory must ex-
plain. Consequently, they are often resilient over theory change.
       4. Nevertheless, phenomenological laws need not have indefi nite 
tenure. For instance, radical theoretical—or even experimen-
tal—change may show that the degree or type of approximation 
involved in accepting a phenomenological laws may make it con-
textually no longer admissible to deem such a law as (approxi-
mately) correct. In Section 3 it will be argued that this is, indeed, 
the situation of the Law of Ancestral Heredity in the light of 
postgenomic developments. There is no evidence in biology that 
there is convergence to any set of phenomenological laws that 
appear so safe from future rejection (or, at least, radical revi-
sion) to warrant deep ontological commitment. Indeed, if struc-
tural realism is committed to such laws as the only relevant 
structures, it will not fare better than object-oriented realism.
17 Note the qualifi cation, “by and large”—this is not being presented as an 
exceptionless claim.
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       5. The fi nal point is polemical and historical—the cogency of the 
arguments presented here does not depend on its validity but it 
help show what, at least partly, motivates this position. Points 
3 and 4 have much in common with logical empiricism, in par-
ticular, the views of Neurath, Reichenbach, and Nagel. What are 
being called phenomenological laws here are generalizations of 
what the logical empiricists called protocol sentences expressed 
in a physical language (the generalization being that these 
phenomenological laws are universally quantifi ed over the rel-
evant domain). Like protocol sentences, these laws are corrigible 
though, unlike protocol sentences, they are not the sole epis-
temic basis for the relevant theoretical models.18 The attitude 
towards ontological commitment expressed here is also similar 
to that of those logical empiricists who endorsed some form of 
“realism” but saw it as being consistent with their empiricism in 
contrast to the types of realism associated with object-oriented 
or structural realism.
The scope of this alternative position is at present intended to be limit-
ed to biological contexts in which there are no known “deep” structures 
(such as symmetry groups in some physical contexts) which cannot be 
easily interpreted as phenomenological laws.
3. Biological Laws and Structural Realism
As noted earlier, a case against object-oriented realism in biology could 
have made profi table use of examples such as the gene or information. 
Equally apt ecological examples would include carrying capacity, cli-
max community, and intrinsic growth rate. In developmental biology 
terms that have undergone radical shifts of empirical signifi cance in-
clude “genotype” and “norm of reaction” (Sarkar 1999). However, the 
only published defenses of structural realism in biology (French 2011, 
2012) rely on Dupré and O’Malley’s (2007, 2009) critique of biological 
individuality as delimiting a unique set of (biological) objects. There 
are two pitfalls with this line of argument:
      (1) Dupré and O’Malley’s concerns are synchronic, to deny at this 
time the possibility of a unique ontology of well-defi ned objects 
constituting the biological realm. Instead, they opt for pluralism 
and what is called a “promiscuous realism” (Dupré 1996) about 
objects. Leaving aside a discussion of the plausibility of promis-
cuity for some other occasion, in this context what is at stake is 
the diachronic identity of objects across theory change because 
that is what structural realism denies. The problems raised by 
Dupré and O’Malley are tangential to this issue.
18 Rather, they are the explanans in Nagel-type models of reduction (see Nagel 
[1961]).
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     (2) The second problem is both philosophically and biologically 
more important. Long ago, Nagel (1951, 1952) pointed out that 
any mereological decomposition of an object requires theoretical 
assumptions. Objects do not simply exist in a categorical spatial 
hierarchy; rather, to say that a given object consists of a speci-
fi ed set of parts is to make a theoretical claim, one choice among 
others about how to decompose a whole into its parts. The co-
gency of a decomposition depends on the empirical success of 
this theory along with the relevant theoretical claims about the 
behaviors of the whole and the parts (including their interac-
tions). While Nagel made this perceptive observation in an ex-
plicitly biological context, it is relevant to all scientifi c contexts 
in which hierarchical organization is presumed. The biological 
context introduces an added complexity: the wholes, as well as 
the parts, are themselves (a) historically evolved objects19 that 
(b) must be individuated using theoretical criteria—that is, be-
yond Nagel, even what the whole is requires theoretical specifi -
cation. Physical individuals need not be organismic individuals: 
in most physical mammal bodies the vast majority of cells are 
not those of the mammalian individual qua mammal. (Consider, 
for instance, the human skin or intestine—there are 10 times as 
many non-human cells in the latter as there are human cells in 
a typical body [roughly 1014 of the latter].) Genotypic individuals 
need not be physical individuals, e.g., in the cases of dandeli-
ons or aphids. In fact, what Dupré and O’Malley’s (2007, 2009) 
analyses show is the ubiquity of the individuation problem in 
the metagenomic context (which is not unexpected).
To make a case against object-oriented realism on the basis of problems 
of biological individuality will require (i) the specifi cation of a theoreti-
cal individuality criterion (genotypic, immunological, organismic, etc.) 
and (ii) a demonstration of the diachronic ephemerality of these indi-
viduals across theory change. French does not do this, and it remains 
an open question whether biological individuals, however defi ned (so 
long as these defi nitions are exact and explicit), are as ephemeral as, 
say, genes or information.
The last paragraph may well have been a digression from the ar-
gument of this paper since it agrees with structural realists that an 
ontology of biological objects is far too unstable to warrant “realism.” 
What is more problematic for French’s argument is the question of the 
resilience of biological laws. It will be instructive to return to the Law 
of Ancestral Heredity. It was pointed out in Section 2 that the funda-
mental mathematical (read “structural”) claim of that law, that is, the 
geometric regression of correlation with ancestral relatives, survived 
the transition from biometry to (Mendelian) quantitative genetics. 
19 See, in this context, Buss (1987) and the commentary by Falk and Sarkar 
(1992).
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The potential trouble is that the postgenomic era is witnessing a much 
more radical shift in the understanding of heredity than the shift from 
biometry to Mendelism (though the ongoing shift is as yet poorly un-
derstood even within biology, let alone in the philosophy of science). It 
was noted in Section 2 that few DNA sequences exhibit Mendelian pat-
terns of inheritance. Add to this (i) that horizontal DNA transfer across 
lineages has been ubiquitous in early evolution (which, either in the 
number of years or in the number of generations, has been the longest 
period of evolution), (ii) large DNA sequences often duplicate during 
reproduction (and this process is now widely recognized as being criti-
cal for the generation of evolutionary novelty), and (iii) genomes tend 
to expand through a variety of molecular mechanisms due purely to the 
physics of DNA interactions (Lynch 2007). It is questionable that the 
Mendelian rules will survive this transition except as approximations 
applicable to a tiny fraction of inherited traits (though these are the 
ones that dominated research in twentieth-century biology because the 
Mendelian rules they followed made them easily tractable). It appears 
unlikely—though this is as yet unproven—that the Law of Ancestral 
Heredity will survive this ongoing transition any better; worse, given 
that it is an approximation even in a Mendelian context, it will become 
irrelevant. The philosophically salient point is that even phenomeno-
logical laws do not have indefi nite tenure though they generally have 
longer ones than theoretical objects.
A potentially more interesting “law” is the Price equation on which 
French (2012) aptly focuses. This equation, which has recently been the 
focus of sustained interest within evolutionary biology (Frank 2007), 
began its remarkable career as an intended reformulation of what 
Fisher (1930) called the fundamental theorem of natural selection 
(Price 1972). However, it turned out to be more general in two impor-
tant ways: (i) it can recursively incorporate the operation of selection at 
multiple levels of a hierarchy, and (ii) it does not depend on the details 
of the Mendelian model of inheritance. This generality makes the Price 
equation more akin to a constitutive framework in which a variety of 
laws can be formulated (or, equivalently, models can be constructed) 
than to an individual law—this point will be relevant in Section 6.
But there are ample grounds at least for caution, perhaps downright 
skepticism. While Fisher regarded his theorem as fundamental, and a 
minority cadre of very vocal theoretical population geneticists have fol-
lowed him in extolling its virtues, it should not be forgotten that the 
other two major founders of theoretical population genetics, Haldane 
(1932) and Wright (1930), were skeptical of its signifi cance (Edwards 
1994). If taken as an exact claim, that is, its mathematical form is sup-
posed to capture the operation of selection in toto, the assumptions of 
the theorem hold for vanishingly few cases. The same problem carries 
over to the Price equation: more technically, both Fisher’s theorem and 
the Price equation make strong and debilitating assumptions of the 
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additivity of the effects of alleles (or their equivalents at other levels 
of organization).20 Now, if Fisher’s theorem and the Price equations 
are taken to be approximate, then it is less than clear what ontological 
signifi cance should be attached to the persistence of such a structure. 
(However, both the theorem and the equation now become applicable 
to many more situations.) A way out would be to regard either of them 
as an idealization but then it would be one requiring a host of counter-
factual assumptions: it is up to structural realists to show how such 
extreme idealizations can ground deep ontological commitments. This 
may not be an impossible task. Meanwhile, at present, there is ample 
ground to doubt the signifi cance of the Price equation—moreover, and 
perhaps most importantly, what will happen to it in post-genomic ac-
counts of heredity also remains far from clear. It takes a lot of faith to 
assume it will be resilient in the way that structural realism requires. 
Worse, no other putative biological law provides better prospects for 
structural realism.
4. Biological Organization and Structural Realism
The failure of biological laws to underpin structural realism does not 
sound the death knell of that doctrine in the biological context. Rather, 
structural realists would do well to focus their attention on biological 
organization. This means a shift of focus from what may be called no-
mological particulars (individual laws) to constitutive frameworks in 
which these nomological claims can be formulated.21
Historically, two distinct themes have been important:
      (1) Since the late eighteenth century, and even after the demise 
of traditional vitalism in the nineteenth century, biology has 
persistently accommodated research programs based on the as-
sumption that biological organisms have some feature(s) that 
distinguish them from what may be called purely physical (or 
chemical) structures. In general, there was no claim that bio-
logical organisms exhibited mechanisms at variance with the 
known physical (and chemical) ones; rather, invoking only these 
mechanisms was deemed insuffi cient for the satisfactory expla-
nation of biological phenomena. The various research programs 
that incorporate such assumptions may be distinguished into 
two groups22:
20 See, however, Frank (1997) who defends the additivity assumption but 
nevertheless accepts that it imposes some restrictions.
21 That is, within a constitutive framework, a variety of laws can be formulated. 
Typically, in biological contexts these laws are called models.
22 The characterizations given here intentionally avoid the issue of reductionism 
which will be fully broached in Section 5.
 S. Sarkar, Structural Realism in Biology: A (Sympathetic) Critique 47
      i. Teleological holism, discussed in Section 4.1, which empha-
sizes function and teleology in a way that was supposed to 
subordinate the relevant explanatory behaviors of parts to 
goals that were only specifi able by reference to the whole.
     ii. Structural emergentism, discussed in Section 4.2, which 
emphasizes what is typically referred to as the emergence 
of systemic properties which are supposed to be at variance 
with the properties of the constituent parts of these sys-
tems.
      (2) Since the nineteenth century there also has been a long—and, 
at least arguably, so far futile—search for laws of form: prin-
ciples of structural organization which are supposed to explain 
what Raff (1996) called the “shape of life.” These laws of form 
are supposed to explain why, for instance, all animal embryos 
at an early stage of development have either two-fold or fi ve-fold 
symmetry (and no other). The salient research programs will be 
discussed, though only very briefl y, in Section 4.3.
In the present context, what is relevant is that these research pro-
grams emphasize structure over objects. In the case of developmental 
form, the structure is clearly spatial; in the cases of teleological holism 
and structural holism, the structure may be embedded in an abstract 
space but may also be spatial in nature, as is usually the case for the 
structural emergenticists. The details that follow are intended to show 
why these programs may support structural realism. 
4.1. Teleological Holism
An epistemological characterization of the assumptions of research 
programs subsumed under this category is relatively straightforward. 
Organisms (or other wholes) are supposed to be categorically described 
as having goals. Here “categorically described” means a type of de-
scription that is necessary to understand these organisms (wholes) 
qua organisms (wholes). In some form or other, such a view of living 
organisms can be traced back to Aristotle; it is a plausible (and was a 
popular) interpretation of the second part of Kant’s Critique of Judg-
ment. With Kant, nineteenth-century teleological holists such as von 
Baer generally held that the mechanisms operating within living or-
ganisms were no different than those also operating in non-living mat-
ter.23 However, to explain living phenomena satisfactorily required ref-
erence to the goals of the whole: why a part does what it does depends 
on its structural relationships with other parts with which it forms 
a whole; these relationships establish its functional contributions to 
the goals of the whole. Consequently, any determination of the set of 
23 A complex history is being selectively summarized—and perhaps caricatured—
here for philosophical purposes, possibly to the extent of parody. See Lenoir (1989) 
for more detail.
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mechanisms that are explanatorily relevant to the living phenomena 
that are to be explained must take into account how the parts are struc-
tured so as to comprise the whole. As Lenoir (1989: ix) puts it: this was 
“a period in the history of the life sciences when the imputation of pur-
posiveness was not regarded an embarrassment but rather an accepted 
fact, and when the principal goal was to reap the benefi ts of mechanis-
tic explanation by fi nding the means of incorporating them within the 
guidelines of a teleological framework.” A more radical version of these 
claims would go further to argue that what the parts are is relatively 
irrelevant compared to the structure: this is the form that teleological 
holism took under the guise of cybernetic models in the mid-twentieth 
century (see below). An ontological characterization of these doctrines 
adds an ontological gloss on the claims of this paragraph (but does not 
change any other feature).
The mid- and late nineteenth century saw the relentless progress 
of mechanistic explanations in the life sciences, that is, explanations of 
the properties of wholes from those of their constituent parts and their 
interactions (Sarkar 1998). Nevertheless, a form of teleological holism 
became fashionable in physiology through sustained advocacy by Ber-
nard (1865) and his insistence that the physiological behavior of parts of 
an organism could only be understood in terms of the context in which 
these behaviors occurred, the context being specifi ed by the other parts 
of the functional whole. Other physiologists including Christian Bohr 
and J. S. Haldane in the early twentieth century explicitly embraced 
similar doctrines.24 The critical assumptions were (i) that physiology 
was intrinsically about function and (ii) that function could only be un-
derstood by subordinating the behaviors of parts to that of the whole. Of 
particular interest were co-operative phenomena, in which the increase 
in the number of units results in a non-linear increase of effect, for in-
stance, the S-shaped association curve between hemoglobin and oxygen 
that Bohr established (the “Bohr effect”). These cases often displayed 
feedback regulation—a drop in the response after saturation with oxy-
gen, a feature seen in the S-shape of the hemoglobin-oxygen association 
curve. Structurally what mattered is how the system was constructed 
together and how the parts with their functions interacted with each 
other. In this sense these views were very similar to those of teleological 
holists of the nineteenth century (and, by and large the physiologists 
were explicit in admitting the infl uence of Kant’s third Critique).25 The 
term “holism” was coined later by Smuts (1926), though mainly in an 
evolutionary context, to embrace these views.
Meanwhile, the emergence of biochemistry as an organized disci-
pline under G. W. Hopkins in the 1920s and its empirical successes saw 
24 See J. S. Haldane (1906, 1914); on Bohr, see Tigerstedt (2012). Their views 
also had an infl uence of the non-mechanistic theses promoted by their more famous 
offspring: Niels Bohr and J. B. S. Haldane (Holton 1970; Sarkar 1992b).
25 See, for example, J. S. Haldane (1914).
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mechanistic explanation return to the forefront in contexts in which 
holistic physiology had once reigned unchallenged (Sarkar 1992a). 
However, models of feedback regulation, beginning in the mid-1950s, 
typically based on Wiener’s (1948) cybernetics, gave teleological holism 
a new lease of life.26 The self-regulation of enzyme (more specifi cally, 
lactase) production in bacteria (Escherichia coli in this case) in the 
presence of the relevant substrate (in this case, lactose) emerged as 
a problem of experimental investigation27—the result was the operon 
model, the signifi cance of which will be further discussed in Section 5. 
Monod (1971) later dubbed this work as “molecular cybernetics.”28 Suf-
fi ce it to note that the interest in the regulation in biological systems 
has had a continuous history since the 1950s resulting in the current 
emphasis of gene regulatory networks (GRNs); some of these develop-
ments will be taken up in more detail in Section 4.2.
In the present context what is most salient is the extent to which 
such models of self-regulation make specifi c (that is, detailed) and gen-
eral (that is, applicable to a wide variety of cases) assumptions about 
structural organization. Historically, at the very least, these models 
universally assumed a network structure of interactions between the 
unit components constituting the whole (that is, the interactions could 
not be reduced to a single chain), and typically assumed loops (enabling 
feedback). It can be assumed without loss of generality that the math-
ematical structure required by these models is that of a directed mul-
tigraph29 (which, for ease of formal analysis, is typically reduced to a 
directed graph). The structural realist thesis is now straightforward to 
state: the edge sets, that, is their topological or connectivity features 
(what types of connections there are), will show resilience across theory 
change even when the identity of the vertex set changes. If so, in such 
models, the explanatory weight (however that is explicated) is borne 
by the structure rather than the objects—as structural realism would 
require. There will be more on networks and multigraphs in Section 
4.2 below.
4.2. Structural Emergentism
The focus will continue to be on networks modeled as directed multi-
graphs. However, there is a critical difference between the research 
programs considered here and those mentioned at the end of the Sec-
tion 4.1. The models analyzed here do not insist on some special role 
26 The importance of cybernetics to mid-twentieth-century science is hard to 
understand today (because of its apparently total failure) but can hardly be over-
stated—see Heims (1991).
27 Schaffner (1974) provides a detailed history.
28 Sarkar (1996) provides background.
29 These differ from ordinary graphs insofar as edges and vertices can be of more 
than one type; thus, for instance, more than one edge (each of a different type) can 
join two vertices.
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played by the goals of function of the whole or on whether explana-
tions using constituent parts must refer to the wholes. There is no ex-
plicit teleology in these models. Instead, most (though not all) such 
models are concerned with whether the topology of the edge sets are 
more strongly implicated (that is, bear the most explanatory weight) 
in the behaviors of networks as systems compared to the vertices (ob-
jects) of the multigraph. If so, in this mitigated sense, the behaviors of 
systems involve “emergent” properties, dependent on how a system is 
put together rather than of what it is made.30 An example, discussed in 
some detail by Sarkar (1998: 168 –173), is the molecular explanation of 
dominance which was an ubiquitous feature of classical genetics: why, 
for some traits, the heterozygote is phenotypically identical to one of 
the homozygotes. The best explanation so far seems to be in terms of 
the topology of the reaction networks connecting the DNA specifying 
the alleles to the molecular structures corresponding to the phenotype. 
(However, experimentally, the issue is far from settled.)
The relevance of such a situation to structural realism is straight-
forward: in cases where structure matters more than identity of the 
parts, it is highly likely that the topology of the network will be resil-
ient across many theory changes involving revisions of the identity of 
the units (that is, the edge sets will be more resilient than the vertex 
sets of the multigraph). Moreover, and this point deserves emphasis, 
such resilience is logically independent of whether there is any more 
interesting sense in which the networks exhibit emergent behavior. 
Thus, though this section is on structural emergentism, the emphasis 
is on structure rather than on emergence. In what follows, to focus on 
structure, the issue of emergence will be intentionally ignored.
Complex networks of this type constitute the central metaphor of 
the apparently emerging discipline of systems biology that has become 
a component of postgenomics. Such complex networks are also sup-
posed to explain ecological behavior—in particular, the emergence of 
large-scale order—over both large spatial and temporal scales.31 Most 
models of “complex adaptive systems”’—yet another popular metaphor 
of contemporary science—are network models. In fact, to the extent 
that an alleged science of complexity exists (and there is room for skep-
ticism on this point [Horgan 1995]), it is a science of networks. The rel-
evance to immunology of network models—under the rubric of idiotypic 
networks (Jerne 1974)—has long been postulated though never fully 
satisfactorily demonstrated.
Turning to only somewhat less speculative areas, complex gene 
regulatory networks (GRNs) are supposed to provide, at present, the 
most viable candidates for understanding organismic developmental 
30 This is intended to be a minimalist and neutral epistemological characterization 
of emergence. For an introduction to the tendentious philosophical disputes 
regarding this doctrine, see Bedau and Humphreys (2008).
31 See, for example, Pascual and Dunne (2006) and Fortuna (2007).
 S. Sarkar, Structural Realism in Biology: A (Sympathetic) Critique 51
cycles (from germinal cell through the adult stage to reproduction) 
(Davidson 2006). In this fi eld, they have an illustrious pedigree, go-
ing back to Boveri’s work at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
and continuing to what is called developmental evolution today.32 Cur-
rent GRN models can be traced back to Britten and Davidson’s (1969) 
model which was the fi rst putative general model of eukaryotic gene 
regulation given the complexities of eukaryotic genome structure that 
had begun to be recognized in the 1960s. Though there was some for-
mal similarity between this model and the earlier operon model (for 
prokaryotic gene regulation—see Section 4.1), and textbooks of the pe-
riod routinely (over)emphasize this aspect33, unlike the operon model, 
the Britten-Davidson model was not concerned at all to explain feed-
back regulation; rather its aim is to explain tissue differentiation and 
the development of complex form—hence its inclusion in this section 
rather than in Section 4.1. Though largely ignored for a generation, 
as the complexity of eukaryotic genetics seemed to defy any modeling 
strategy (Sarkar 1996), a much-modifi ed Britten-Davidson model and 
its descendants, in the form of GRNs, have returned to the forefront of 
research in cell differentiation and organismic development in postge-
nomics. Whether these models live up to the hopes of their enthusiasts 
remains to be seen—let me note that, among biologists, there remains 
ample ground for skepticism.34
From the perspective of this paper, these developments suggest 
the following conclusion: to the extent that the biological sciences may 
have any universal mathematical structure (that may potentially play 
the same unifying role as symmetry groups play in modern physics), 
that structure seems to be that of directed multigraphs. Perhaps what 
structural realism should focus on is on the demarcation of the types of 
directed multigraphs that are relevant for biological theory, and then a 
classifi cation of these based on the roles they play in various biological 
sub-disciplines.
4.3. Developmental Form
The fi nal set of research programs to be considered here consists of 
models that have remained speculative throughout their roughly 150-
year history. These are macroscopic models (“macroscopic” in the sense 
that they are concerned with large spatial structures) of developmental 
form, how organisms produce their adult forms through the history of 
interactions between the physical contents of germinal cells and their 
environments. One important class of such models consist of those 
that rely on details of the physical interactions of the molecular con-
stituents—perhaps the best-known such model was that introduced by 
32 Thanks are due to Manfred Laubichler (unpublished work) for providing this 
history.
33 See, for example, Lewin (1974).
34 See Newman (2019). 
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Turing (1952), based on equations for reaction-diffusion systems, and 
capable of generating a wide variety of spatial forms.35 However, what 
are most pertinent to the question of the plausibility of structural real-
ism are models that are based on spatial regularities and transforma-
tions that are independent of assumptions of the details of the under-
lying physical interactions. Nineteenth-century morphologists such as 
Cuvier established several such rules across phylogenetically related 
sets of taxa in a period when virtually nothing was known about the 
underlying physical or chemical mechanisms. Embryologists followed 
their lead by producing similar analyses not only on adult forms but on 
the developmental stages of organisms generating interesting possi-
bilities, for instance, the hypothesis of the existence of a near-universal 
phylotypic stage for many animal phyla (Raff 1996).
In the twentieth century, D’Arcy Thompson’s (1917) On Growth and 
Form provided a remarkable compendium of mathematical rules that 
transform spatial features of one taxon to phylogenetically related spa-
tial features of others. Thompson’s project involved a shift away from 
evolution (and history) to questions of form and universal rules that 
may govern their genesis. For structural realism, what is intriguing 
is that such mathematical transformation rules would likely be inde-
pendent of the details of the underlying physical (or chemical) basis 
and thus be resilient to changes of the ontology of the objects being 
postulated by models of development. Since the 1980s, with the advent 
of ubiquitous computation, a further set of models for spatial patterns 
have been investigated, especially using cellular automata: these mod-
els show how very simple generative rules may lead to complex spatial 
patterns. Beyond organismic development, these rules may also be rel-
evant to the appearance of long-range spatial and temporal patterns in 
ecology (Ermentrout and Edelstein-Keshet 1993).
Returning to organismic development, what remains unclear, is the 
nomological status of D’Arcy Thompson’s and similar transformation 
rules, whether they are any more than piecemeal (accidental) gen-
eralizations that refl ect no deep structure of developmental process-
es. Skeptics of laws of developmental form have ample ammunition 
on their side: after at least 150 years there is no clear example of a 
single well-established theoretical law of form. However, whatever be 
the merit of these hopes, the quest for laws of form seems to continue 
to fi nd deep resonance in the intuitions of many developmental biolo-
gists.36 Arguably, it is even part of what motivates the recent excite-
ment about “developmental evolution” with its goal of explaining much 
of the structural diversity of organisms on the basis of (presumably 
physical) rules of variation at the genomic and other levels of organiza-
35 For a history of these developments, see Keller (2002a).
36 They have also impressed some philosophers. For instance, Fodor and Piattelli-
Palmarini (2010) base part of their argument against natural selection on the basis 
of the existence of such laws of form.
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tion and with natural selection playing much more mitigated role than 
in the received view of evolutionary theory.37 What is most salient (in 
this context) about the project of developmental evolution is that laws 
of form, under the guise of laws of variation (at the genomic and, pos-
sibly, higher levels of organization) are supposed to be more important 
in explaining organismic (spatial) structure and variation than natural 
selection—but further analysis of this project is beyond the scope of 
this paper.
5. A Skeptical Response
It should not go unnoticed that all three organizational examples 
from Section 4 share a common feature: to varying extents, they ex-
press skepticism about the suffi ciency of mechanistic explanation in 
biology, what I have elsewhere defended and called strong reduction 
(Sarkar 1998; see, also, Weber [2005]).38 This is the idea that the behav-
iors of wholes, no matter how novel and unexpected they may appear 
to be, can be explained from the behavior of their (constituent) spatial 
parts (obviously including the interactions of these parts). Skepticism 
about this kind of reductionism, as the research programs discussed 
in Section 4 show, has a long pedigree in the history of biology. As 
emphasized several times earlier, those who deny this kind of reduc-
tionism, but wish to remain within the confi nes of modern (post 17th 
century) science, do not presume that there are processes occurring in 
biological (or, in general, higher structural level) systems that are not 
occurring in physical (or lower structural level) systems. Rather, it is a 
claim about explanatory adequacy or, rather, inadequacy. All research 
programs discussed in Section 4 share this feature.
Now, as I have contended for several decades39, for all the fervor 
that it often generates, anti-reductionism (and the various associat-
ed forms of emergence) are yet to produce viable research programs 
with tangible content, for instance (but not limited to), predictions at 
variance with those made by the mundane reductionism that seems 
to guide almost all experimental research in biology (Weber 2005). In 
fact, perhaps the only positive contribution of anti-reductionism to bi-
ology, but this is an issue not contended by almost all reductionists,40 
is that reductionism provides no epistemic (or ontic, if one so chooses) 
warrant for eliminativism, that is, the view that reduced entities (ob-
37 See Wagner (2007) for an entry into this literature.
38 For expository ease, in what follows, I will call this view reductionism without 
the qualifi er “strong.” For other forms of reductionism, see Sarkar (1998) and the 
encyclopedia article by Brigandt and Love (2008).
39 See Sarkar (1989, 1998, 2008) and Wimsatt and Sarkar (2006). See, also, 
Weber (2005).
40 Almost all, but not all—see Churchland (1986) for a defense of eliminativism 
about folk psychology with respect to neuroscience. Nagel (1949, 1961) rejected 
eliminativism and most reductionists have (wisely) followed his lead.
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jects or processes/ relations/ structures) should be replaced in scientifi c 
discourse by those used to effect the relevant reductions. The claims 
of this paragraph can be bolstered with plentiful and diverse cases, 
especially since the advent of molecular biology in the 1950s.41 Suf-
fi ce it here to mention two canonical examples relevant to teleologi-
cal holism and already mentioned in Section 4.1: the allostery model 
which mechanistically (reductionistically) explained the co-operative 
behavior of macromolecules (including the Bohr effect for hemoglobin), 
and the operon model which so explained feedback regulation of gene 
expression in prokaryotes.42 As indicated in Section 4.1, these examples 
are important because feedback regulation and co-operative phenom-
ena were considered to constitute defi nitive exemplars of challenges to 
reductionism from within the anti-reductionist repertoire. Absorbing 
them within the reductionist agenda does much to defl ate the prospects 
for cogent anti-reductionism.
These observations are pertinent because they help generate a 
strong presumption that all organizational examples of Section 4 may 
represent no more than fl ights of fancy, rich in mystical speculation 
about the nature and direction of biology, particularly of a future biol-
ogy which remains indiscernible today, but are nevertheless devoid of 
empirical content. That is to say, there is no empirical basis for pos-
tulating the structures required by the teleological holists, the struc-
tural emergentists, or the developmental form theorists. It seems odd 
to speculate on the persistence or resilience of structures which have no 
empirical basis today—and worse than odd to draw strong ontological 
conclusions on those grounds.
Nevertheless, excessive skepticism or criticism of incipient scientif-
ic programs is also often misplaced. Take genetics. Returning to a case 
introduced in Section 2, if Pearson’s typically highly cogent biometrical 
criticisms of the new Mendelism around 1900–1905 had derailed the 
program of Mendelism initiated by Bateson and, slightly later, Pun-
nett, long before the advent of successful model-building by Haldane, 
Fisher, and Wright,43 theoretical population genetics may well have 
not emerged as early as it did or, perhaps, never in the form in which 
it is now known and provides the basis for evolutionary theory.44 It 
can, therefore, be argued that all three programs—teleological holism, 
structural emergentism, and developmental form theory—should be 
treated with tolerance, at least for the time being. Here, tolerance 
is supposed to mean that such research programs should not be dis-
missed out of hand, either epistemically (in terms of serious consider-
41 See Sarkar (1998) and Weber (2005).
42 For more details on these examples, see Sarkar (1998).
43 For historical and philosophical details, see Provine (1971), and Sarkar (2004, 
2007).
44 Obviously, the second disjunct expresses some skepticism about a realist 
interpretation about even a body of science as empirically well-established as 
theoretical population genetics. This skepticism is intentional.
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ation and active debate) or institutionally (in terms of funding, etc.), in 
the way, say, traditional vitalism or Intelligent Design or other forms 
of creationism should be so dismissed.
However, in the case of teleological holism, the time for such toler-
ance may well have long expired. As noted in Section 4.1, this set of 
claims emerged in their modern form as far back as the late eighteenth 
century, fl ourished for a while in the nineteenth century, was given 
new life by the physiology of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, and reinvigorated again in the cybernetic era—all this while 
producing no tangible alternative to the expanding research program 
of resolute mechanists. The time has come to take stock of these re-
peated failures rather than wait for promissory notes to be delivered.45 
Similar pessimism seems also warranted for the search for develop-
mental laws of form. D’Arcy Thompson’s On Growth and Form contin-
ues to provide inspiration to those who seek laws of form, and the aes-
thetic appeal of the book is denied by few—nevertheless it takes some 
faith to claim that Thompson’s project any longer continues to be a 
useful resource for biologically-relevant inquiry (and, indeed, probably 
most historians of biology would now judge that it never did). Let me 
add that I do have that faith but my position is that of a small minority 
within developmental biology. To the very limited extent that models 
in the tradition of Turing (1952) have been successful towards the ex-
planation of biological form, they have done so (as noted in Section 4.3) 
purely mechanistically, by relying on the physical (and chemical) prop-
erties of individual parts rather than mainly on structure independent 
of constituent details. Recent developments suggest the irrelevance of 
Turing-type models in contexts where they once appeared most prom-
ising, for instance, in explaining segmentation patterns in insects.46 
There appears at present to be only one prospect that may warrant 
tempering this pessimism—if the program of developmental evolution 
succeeds, and does so by explicitly going beyond standard mechanistic 
(reductionist) models (as, for instance, Laubichler and Wagner [2001] 
promise), laws of form may well enjoy a new lease of life.
This leaves the case of structural emergentism. As briefl y indicated 
in Section 4.2, but worth special emphasis here (where a more philo-
sophically critical appraisal of this position is being attempted), the 
issue of emergence is a red herring. In the present context it is not par-
ticularly interesting whether there is any interesting sense in which a 
feature of a system is relevantly different from those of its constituent 
interacting parts to be deemed emergent. What is at stake is whether 
in accounting for the feature, what bears the explanatory weight is 
the structure of the system (as modeled) compared to the identity of 
45 It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess whether a more positive—or, 
at least, a less negative—assessment is warranted with respect to the relationship 
between the mental and the biological. There is a vast philosophical literature to this 
topic which, fortunately, is not relevant to the topic of this paper.
46 See Akam (1989).
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the individual parts (objects). A full explication of “explanatory weight” 
is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffi ce it here to reduce it to the 
question whether the explanation can be extended to a large variety of 
other systems that have the same structure but differ in the constitu-
ent objects: the greater the differences between the sets of objects, the 
greater the extent to which the structure, rather than the objects, bears 
the explanatory weight.
The molecular explanation of dominance (which was alluded to in 
Section 4.2) may be one exemplar of this possibility. However, it may 
well be an isolated case given that no other such case seems to have 
been offered in the philosophical literature since Sarkar (1998) ana-
lyzed the case of dominance. Moroever, it is hard to be generally opti-
mistic about the prospects of GRN models or any of the other kinds of 
network models that dominate the bulk of theoretical biology today. 
However, in the case of GRN models, it is too early to be sure of their 
eventual fate but this should surely be regarded as a situation in which 
excessive skepticism about an incipient research program is unwar-
ranted. Nevertheless, all that there is at present is a promissory note.
6. Final Remarks
Where does this leave us? I wish to make fi ve observations:
       1. Structural realists have a wealth of evidence on their side drawn 
from the history of science in support of the claim that theoreti-
cal structures (for instance, relations between putative objects) 
are far more resilient than theoretical objects across radical the-
ory change. This assessment is not limited to the biological con-
texts with which this paper is concerned. A large array of studies 
by (both epistemic and ontic) structural realists provide support 
for it from the physical sciences (Ladyman and Ross 2007). 
       2. Though laws (a particular type of structure) do enjoy this kind 
of preferential resilience compared to theoretical objects, at least 
in biological contexts they appear to do so only to the extent that 
they are phenomenological (Section 3). Moreover, even the most 
resilient phenomenological laws in biology do not show the de-
gree of resilience that would warrant confi dence in claims of re-
alism about them. Section 3 showed this to be very likely in the 
case of the Law of Ancestral Heredity. The status of the Price 
equation is unlikely to be different though the verdict is still 
out—and will not be settled in the foreseeable future.
       3. What are more likely to have the required resilience—that is, 
resilience not reducible to being phenomenological—are consti-
tutive frameworks in which a variety of laws can be formulated. 
Recall the discussion of the Price equation in Section 3: to the 
extent that it seems to exhibit a high degree of resilience, it is 
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due to its being more akin to a constitutive framework rather 
than an individual law.
       4. However, there is no reason to suppose that entire frameworks 
(including those that are at the highest level of generality as ex-
plicated in Point 3 above) may never be entirely replaced. What 
is troubling is that neither French (2011, 2012) nor any other 
structural realist seems to offer arguments to the contrary. 
       5. Section 4 noted that directed multigraphs may provide an ap-
propriate constitutive framework for much of theoretical biol-
ogy. Now, directed multigraphs are mathematical structures at 
such a high level of formal abstraction that it is important to 
show that the claim being made here about them is not entirely 
vacuous (similar, for instance, to a claim that real and complex 
fi elds [in the algebraic sense] provide a constitutive framework 
for physics). There are at least two restrictions that the choice 
of directed graphs immediately imposes: (i) Somewhat trivially, 
the relevant structures must exhibit some asymmetry between 
units (vertices) in their interactions which is represented by 
the directions of connecting edges. (ii) Far more importantly, 
directed graphs are discrete mathematical structures. Both re-
strictions carry over to directed multigraphs. Thus, adopting a 
framework of directed multigraphs assumes that biological mod-
els must be so constructed that the putative objects and relation-
ships between them can be individuated into district sets. This 
excludes for instance, modeling organismic development using 
what used to be called morphogenetic fi elds, or in the way en-
visioned by Turing and those who followed his tradition. This 
means that claiming that the appropriate structures are directed 
multigraphs is a claim with non-trivial empirical consequences. 
It remains an open question whether it is correct and, if so, what 
other restrictions can be imposed on that structure while retain-
ing its aim of representing as much of biological phenomena as 
possible.
These observations may not be much in the way of a conclusion. So, I 
will fi nally end by claiming something more defi nite. To the extent that 
this paper has defended anything at all, it has defended the impor-
tance of theoretical structures as opposed to theoretical objects. This 
amounts to an endorsement of structuralism as, for instance, explicat-
ed long ago in a mathematical context by the Bourbaki group. But it 
does not take any position on realism. A quote from Stein (1989: 57) is 
particularly relevant: “[O]ur science comes closest to comprehending 
the ‘real’, not in its account of ‘substances’ and their kinds, but in its ac-
count of the ‘Forms’ which phenomena ‘imitate’ (for ‘Forms’ read ‘theo-
retical structures’, for ‘imitate’, ‘are represented by’).” Ladyman and 
Ross (2007) take Stein to be sympathetic to structural realism. Arguing 
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against the structural realists, Stanford (2006) takes Stein (1989) to 
be defending a sophisticated instrumentalism. Neither of these inter-
pretations appears to be fully accurate though Stanford’s come closer 
(notice Stein’s careful qualifi cation “comes closest to” before any refer-
ence to the “real”).
But the deeper point that Stein is making is one I would endorse 
and extend. Structural characterizations provide resilience against 
radical theory change. In particular, empirically successful phenom-
enological laws, interpreted as structures, not only often survive such 
changes but constrain the form of revised theories by being part of the 
data that must be accommodated. In general, these structures not only 
permit persistently corrected predictions (and the use of this ability 
for technological and other purposes) but, even as they change, they 
provide better representations of the world in the sense that they are 
resources for further enquiry that enable the extension of individual 
sciences and, often enough, their iterative unifi cation. Now, what does 
the claim “these structures are real” or “these structures are all that 
can be known” add? Almost certainly, something psychological, espe-
cially for those whom James would call tender-minded (as opposed to 
those who are tough-minded empiricists). But it does not add anything 
of philosophical signifi cance. Like Stein (1989: 65), we should main-
tain: realism, “yes”; but instrumentalism, “yes, also”; no only to anti-
realism—with anti-realism including not only constructive empiricism 
but, especially, social constructivism and the other various fashionable 
forms of relativism that have unfortunately come to dominate much of 
the history of science in recent decades.
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